0007WC06122025RUSSOUKRAINIANWAR OPINION THE 2022 RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR
0007WC06122025RUSSOUKRAINIANWAR
OPINION
THE 2022 RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR
The purpose of this opinion is to have a look at and legally assess the beginnings of the 2022 RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR to better discover and hopefully resolve some of the root challenges in order to achieve a lasting peace.
This opinion is made up of some opinion and a number of questions.
The first relates to the decision made by the Russian Federation with capital in Moscow on the Continent of Europe, to embark on a special operation in Ukraine.
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/video-putin-war-ukraine-documentary/
The question is what are all the forces, interests and or nations which had an input in that security council meeting but who may not have been at the meeting biologically. The purpose of this is to find out all the sources of the special military operation. The meeting was held on February 21st 2022. It is also very, very important to legally and accurately determine if compulsion was used to actualise the outcome of that meeting. If there was some compulsion, what was the source of the compulsion?
One of the senior government officials clearly did not support the invasion but was also very much afraid, as can be seen from his demeanour. What are the sources of this apprehension?
This particular official requested whether the meeting had to hold that very day. The response showed that there was some urgency to conclude the meeting that day. What is the real source of this urgency? The special military operation speech was delivered on the 24th February 2022.
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843
Therefore, why couldn't the request of the senior government official in the security meeting be accepted which would have meant the meeting could hold on the 22nd or 23rd February 2022 or some other time.
'The main aims of the special military operation are the protection of the DPR and LPR, forcing Ukraine to a neutral status, demilitarization and denazification of its state and social life, elimination of threats to Russia emanating from Ukrainian territory due to its development by NATO countries. The operation is not directed against the people of Ukraine.'
https://pekin.mid.ru/en/news/about_the_special_military_operation_in_ukraine/
'On the 22nd of February 2022, Russia's parliament ratifies friendship treaties with 2 "independent republics" in east Ukraine's Donbass.'
The war in Donbass has been on since the year 2014. Why was there a need to conduct a special military operation in Donbass when a sizeable portion of Donbass was largely under the control of what some refer to as Russian-backed separatists? Why not just provide a large and effective legal peacekeeping force to help legally protect LHR and DPR thereby honoring and enforcing the association of friendship with Luhansk People's Republic and Donetsk People's Republic?
For instance, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO has been leading a peace-support operation in Kosovo – the Kosovo Force (KFOR) – since June 1999.
Even from a military perspective, why was it possible for the Russian military to be so easily repelled in its first attacks on Donbass by the Ukrainian military once the Special Military Operation started losing no less than 50 soldiers on the first day at Shchastia! From a military perspective, would it not have been more effective to secure in a considerable manner, the territory where there is a cooperation agreement and where Russia has had strong practical influence since the year 2014?
'The Ukrainian interior ministry reported that Russian forces had captured the villages of Horodyshche and Milove in Luhansk. The Ukrainian Centre for Strategic Communication reported that the Ukrainian army had repelled an attack at Shchastia (near Luhansk) and retaken control of the town, claiming nearly 50 Russian lives.'
'The primary protection for any entity from external aggression is the fundamental principle of the prohibition on the use of force enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Charter, particularly Article 2(4).
This principle generally prohibits any state from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state in its international relations. This means that the "parent" nation cannot legally use military force to prevent the independence-seeking nation from seceding, as this would be considered a violation of the UN Charter, unless authorized by the UN Security Council or in self-defense against an armed attack from an external source.'
In my opinion, there may have been some legality if The Russian Federation, with capital in Moscow, only provided legal support for LHR and DPR. What is concerning about this is that it appears there was more emphasis on invading other parts of Ukraine than consolidate in the area where there could both be legal cover and local support. In my opinion, not placing an emphasis on this from a military standpoint does not make sense. It is my opinion that those who were influencing the war from the 21st February 2022 to the expansion of the war on the 24th February 2022 and after that are not the same as those who influenced support for Russian-backed separatists in Donbass since year 2014. Quite paradoxically this strategy only really benefitted Ukraine because the spread of Russian forces to invade other parts of Ukraine and not consolidating in Donbass from the 24th February 2022 really did not help The Russian Federation with capital in Moscow as much.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/4/ukraine-crisis-who-are-the-russia-backed-separatists
The map immediately above clearly shows that a considerable portion of Donbass was under the control of Russian-backed separatists as of 4th February 2022. This area was directly accessible by The Russian Federation with capital in Moscow.
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Another observation is that there were attacks on Chernihiv, which borders Belarus, on the 24th February 2022, the first day of the Special Military Operation. However, there was no attack on Kiev which is next to Chernihiv and also borders Belarus. Considering the strategic value of the capital for achieving the objectives of the SMO, this also appears rather queer.
This further shows that there was something wrong with the decision to launch the Special Military Operation at that time and the way and manner in which it was executed.
Since denazification was also an objective of the Special Military Operation, in my opinion, this objective would not be feasible without the legal and humane denazification of the leadership of Ukraine. This objective is not my view, but this is an attempt to compare an objective of the SMO with realistic actions required to achieve that objective. The Federal Republic of Germany during World War 2 after the defeat of the Nazi regime had a good portion of its leadership legally prosecuted at the Nuremberg trials, which may be seen as a denazification process. This is only to further show that something was not right in the implementation of the SMO.
Some wars where the capital or major area was attacked very early in the campaign.
Napoleon's attack against Russia in 1812, was directed at getting to Moscow as a main objective.
'In the Iraq War, the United States of America attacked Baghdad.
'The first major U.S. attacks on Baghdad during the 2003 Iraq War began with precision-guided missiles targeting government facilities on the night of March 21, 2003, following the initial invasion start on March 19th, with daylight bombing of Republican Guard units and key areas intensifying in late March and early April leading up to Baghdad's fall on April 9th.'
The first NATO airstrikes in the conflict that included Belgrade occurred on the night of March 24, 1999, as part of Operation Allied Force, targeting military sites in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Operation Allied Force began on this date.
NATO struck Tripoli.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=v-zGFgNKxRc
'The first NATO air strikes on targets within or around Tripoli occurred in the initial days of the international military intervention, which began on March 19, 2011.'
Another important aspect is the time Russian Assets started being frozen and or seized.
'Europe's freezing and seizure of Russian assets began immediately after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with the EU immobilizing around €210 billion of Russian Central Bank reserves held in member states, primarily at Euroclear, alongside G7 partners freezing billions more. While initial actions were freezes, the debate shifted to confiscation and use as collateral to fund Ukraine's defense, leading to proposals in 2024/2025 to use the interest and eventually the principal of these frozen funds for loans and reconstruction, with ongoing legal and political hurdles.
Key Developments:
February 2022: Russia's full-scale invasion triggers immediate EU sanctions, freezing Russian Central Bank assets held within the EU.
€210 Billion Frozen: The EU immobilizes roughly €210 billion, with the largest portion (€185bn+) held by the Belgium-based clearing house Euroclear.
G7 & Partners Join: The US, UK, Canada, Japan, Australia, and Switzerland implement similar measures, freezing hundreds of billions globally.
Shift to Confiscation: By 2024/2025, focus moved from freezing to using the frozen assets for Ukraine, leveraging the interest generated (around €3bn/year) and exploring loans backed by the assets themselves.
Legal & Political Hurdles: Questions of international law (sovereign immunity) and ensuring investor confidence in Europe have slowed outright seizure, though proposals for "reparations loans" are advancing.
Current Status (Late 2025):
The EU is moving towards a plan to use the value of these immobilized assets as collateral for massive loans to Ukraine, with a political agreement sought by December 2025 for a formal proposal.
Belgium, as the host of Euroclear, seeks guarantees from other EU nations to cover potential legal challenges from Russia.
In essence, the freezing started in 2022, but the "seizure" is a phased process, with Europe currently negotiating the legal framework to transfer the funds' value to support Ukraine's reconstruction.'
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With hundreds of billions of US dollars of Russian assets frozen and or seized, a very important point needs to be legally and accurately assessed. If any nation that froze and or seized Russian Assets was also involved in getting the Russian Federation, with its capital in Moscow, to invade Ukraine on the 24th February 2022, then, in my opinion, that would translate to a very serious premeditated crime. This would mean that the Russian Federation, with its capital in Moscow, may have been maneuvered into a full-scale war with Ukraine. It would also appear as though those who acquiesced or were involved in that, overtly and or covertly, who also froze Russian Assets did that intentionally because they wanted to put Russia in a conflict where the blame would be on Russia as well as also freeze and or seize some of Russia’s wealth. This is precarious for any nation which may be involved in this.
This is a pure instance of premeditated illegality in multiple dimensions. This creates unimaginable spiritual legality gaps for those who are responsible.
For any nation involved in this, the saving grace from the spiritual legality perspective may be if these funds have not been spent and or touched at all and have accrued interest on a continuous basis since their freezing.
DEFINITION
WAR CRIMES
https://unric.org/en/international-law-understanding-justice-in-times-of-war/
'What are war crimes?
War crimes are violations of international humanitarian law (whose perpetrators incur individual criminal responsibility under international law).
Consequently, unlike the crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity, war crimes always take place in the context of an armed conflict, whether international or not.
War crimes include murder, torture, pillage, or intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population, humanitarian aid workers, religious and educational buildings and hospitals. The use of weapons not authorised by international conventions, such as chemical weapons or cluster munitions, can also be considered a war crime.
Unlike genocide and crimes against humanity, war crimes can be perpetrated against a variety of victims, whether combatants or non-combatants, depending on the type of crime.'
War crime | History, Examples, & International Rules | Britannica
https://www.britannica.com/topic/war-crime
'Adolf Eichmann listening to an Israeli court's verdict
Adolf Eichmann listening to an Israeli court's verdict Former Nazi official Adolf Eichmann listening as an Israeli court declares him guilty on all counts at his war crimes trial in Jerusalem, 1961.
war crime, in international law, serious violation of the laws or customs of war as defined by international customary law and international treaties.
Definition and conceptual development
The term war crime has been difficult to define with precision, and its usage has evolved constantly, particularly since the end of World War I. The first systematic attempt to define a broad range of war crimes was the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field—also known as the “Lieber Code” after its main author, Francis Lieber—which was issued by U.S. Pres. Abraham Lincoln during the American Civil War and distributed among Union military personnel in 1863. For example, the Lieber Code held that it was a “serious breach of the law of war to force the subjects of the enemy into service for the victorious government” and prohibited “wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country,” including rape, maiming, and murder, all of which carried the penalty of death. More recently, definitions of war crimes have been codified in international statutes, such as those creating the International Criminal Court and the war crimes tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, for use in international war crimes tribunals. In contrast to earlier definitions, modern definitions are more expansive and criminalize certain behaviours committed by civilians as well as by military personnel.
Immediately following World War I, the victorious Allied powers convened a special Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties. The commission’s report recommended that war crimes trials be conducted before the victors’ national courts and, when appropriate, before an inter-Allied tribunal. The Allies prepared an initial list of about 900 suspected war criminals and submitted the list to Germany. Although heads of state traditionally had enjoyed immunity from prosecution, the commission’s main target was Germany’s Emperor (Kaiser) William II, whom most of the Allies (though not the United States) wished to hold responsible for numerous violations of the laws of war. William, however, took refuge in the Netherlands, which refused to extradite him, and he was never tried. Most of the remaining suspected war criminals on the list similarly managed to avoid prosecution, because Germany was reluctant to turn them over to the Allies. Instead, a compromise was reached whereby the Allies permitted a small number of suspects to be tried in Germany before the Supreme Court in Leipzig. These prosecutions resulted in few convictions, with most sentences ranging from a few months to four years in prison.
The Nürnberg and Tokyo trials
The next major attempt to prosecute war criminals occurred in Europe and Asia after World War II. Throughout the war, the Allies had cited atrocities committed by the Nazi regime of Adolf Hitler and announced their intention to punish those guilty of war crimes. The Moscow Declaration of 1943, issued by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, and the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, issued by the United States, Great Britain, and China (and later adhered to by the Soviet Union), addressed the issue of punishing war crimes committed by the German and Japanese governments, respectively.
At the war’s conclusion, representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the provisional government of France signed the London Agreement, which provided for an international military tribunal to try major Axis war criminals whose offenses did not take place in specific geographic locations. This agreement was supported by 19 other governments and included the Nürnberg Charter, which established the Nürnberg tribunal and categorized the offenses within its jurisdiction. The charter listed three categories of crime: (1) crimes against peace, which involved the preparation and initiation of a war of aggression, (2) war crimes (or “conventional war crimes”), which included murder, ill treatment, and deportation, and (3) crimes against humanity, which included political, racial, and religious persecution of civilians. This last category included what is commonly called genocide.
The term genocide was coined by the Polish American legal scholar Raphael Lemkin and first appeared in print in his work Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (1944). The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, defined genocide as including killing or inflicting serious physical or mental injury on members of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group with the intention of bringing about the group’s destruction, in whole or in part. The convention made genocide an international crime that could be prosecuted in the court of any country. Because the Nürnberg trials preceded the convention, however, Nazi war criminals were not prosecuted for genocide.
Examining the Nuremberg trials for Nazi war criminals
The International Military Tribunal in Nürnberg, Germany, tried 22 Nazi leaders, including one, Martin Bormann, who was tried in absentia. The trial was conducted in four languages and lasted nearly 11 months. All but three of the defendants were convicted; 12 were sentenced to death. The remaining defendants received lengthy prison terms, which they served at Spandau Prison in West Berlin. Subsequent trials were held under the auspices of Control Council Law No. 10, which was used to prosecute accused Nazi war criminals whose crimes took place in specific locales.
Japanese defendants accused of war crimes were tried by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which was established by a charter issued by U.S. Army Gen. Douglas MacArthur. The so-called Tokyo Charter closely followed the Nürnberg Charter. The trials were conducted in English and Japanese and lasted nearly two years. Of the 25 Japanese defendants (all of whom were convicted), 7 were sentenced to hang, 16 were given life imprisonment, and 2 were sentenced to lesser terms. Except for those who died early of natural causes in prison, none of the imprisoned Japanese war criminals served a life sentence. Instead, by 1958 the remaining prisoners had been either pardoned or paroled.
Key People: Hermann Göring Adolf Eichmann Radovan Karadžić Albert Kesselring Baltasar Garzón
From their outset, the war crimes trials were dismissed by critics merely as “victor’s justice,” because only individuals from defeated countries were prosecuted and because the defendants were charged with acts that allegedly had not been criminal when committed. In support of the trials, the Nürnberg tribunal cited the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), which formally outlawed war and made the initiation of war a crime for which individuals could be prosecuted.
After the Nürnberg and Tokyo trials, numerous international treaties and conventions attempted to devise a comprehensive and enforceable definition of war crimes. The four separate Geneva conventions, adopted in 1949, in theory made prosecutable certain acts committed in violation of the laws of war. The conventions provided for the protection of wounded, sick, and shipwrecked military personnel, prisoners of war, and civilians. Like the convention on genocide, however, the Geneva conventions specified that trials were to be arranged by individual governments. In 1977 two protocols were adopted to clarify and supplement the Geneva conventions. Recognizing that many conflicts were internal rather than international in scope, the second protocol afforded greater protection to guerrilla combatants in civil wars or wars of “self-determination.”
Rwanda and Yugoslavia war crimes tribunals
Radovan Karadžić
Radovan KaradžićBosnian Serb wartime leader Radovan Karadžić awaiting the reading of the verdict at his trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, The Hague, Netherlands, March 24, 2016. Karadžić was found guilty on 10 of 11 counts, including responsibility for genocide committed in the Srebrenica massacre in 1995.
Nearly 50 years passed between the Nürnberg and Tokyo trials and the next formal international prosecution of war crimes. In May 1993, in an attempt to prevent further acts of “ethnic cleansing” in the conflict between states of the former Yugoslavia and to restore peace and security to the Balkan region, the United Nations Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, commonly known as the ICTY. In November 1994 the UN responded to charges of genocide in Rwanda by creating the ICTR, formally known as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994.
Both the ICTY and ICTR were international in composition, and neither tribunal sat in the country where the covered conflict occurred; the ICTY was located in The Hague, and the ICTR was located in Arusha, Tanzania. The tribunals had nearly identical governing statutes and a common appellate chamber. Although the Nürnberg and Tokyo tribunals were empowered to impose capital punishment, the ICTR and ICTY could impose only terms of imprisonment. However, no centralized international prison system was established to house persons convicted of war crimes before the tribunals.
A gacaca court
A genocide suspect standing trial before a gacaca court in Zivu, Rwanda, March 10, 2005.
The governing statutes of the ICTY and ICTR defined war crimes broadly. The ICTY was given jurisdiction over four categories of crime: (1) grave breaches of the Geneva conventions, (2) violations of the laws or customs of war, (3) genocide, and (4) crimes against humanity. Recognizing that crimes against humanity do not necessarily involve a “nexus to armed conflict” and taking into account legislation specifically enacted by the Rwandan government, the statute of the ICTR limited the jurisdiction of the tribunal to Rwandan leaders, while lower-level defendants were to be tried in domestic courts. In both tribunals rape, murder, torture, deportation, and enslavement were subject to prosecution. The tribunals thus were among the first international bodies to recognize sexual violence formally as a war crime.
Srebrenica genocide
Srebrenica genocideCoffins containing the recovered remains of victims of the 1995 Srebrenica genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina, July 2008.
Like the statutes of the Nürnberg and Tokyo tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR statutes did not consider the official position of an individual, including his position as head of state, to be a sufficient basis for avoiding or evading criminal culpability. Accordingly, in 1999 the ICTY indicted Slobodan Milošević, the Serbian (1989–97) and Yugoslav (1997–2000) president, for war crimes, and in 2001 he was arrested and extradited to The Hague. Likewise, military and civilian leaders who knew or should have known that their subordinates were committing war crimes were subject to prosecution under the doctrine of command or superior responsibility. Finally, individuals who committed war crimes pursuant to government or military orders were not thereby relieved of criminal liability, though the existence of the order could be used as a mitigating factor. Thus, the rules adopted for the Nürnberg and Tokyo trials continued to influence later efforts to bring suspected war criminals to justice.
Recent developments
In 1993 the Belgian legislature passed a controversial law giving its courts the right to try any individual accused of a war crime anywhere in the world. The law, which resulted in lengthy prison sentences for two Rwandan nuns found guilty of genocide and in judicial complaints against many world leaders (including Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Cuban Pres. Fidel Castro, and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat), was invalidated by the International Court of Justice in 2002. The following year the law was repealed by the Belgian government and replaced by a law requiring that either the victim of the war crime or the accused be a Belgian citizen or resident.
In 1998 in Rome some 150 countries attempted to establish a permanent international criminal court. The negotiations eventually resulted in the adoption by 120 countries of the Rome Statute, a treaty establishing an International Criminal Court (ICC) to be located permanently at The Hague. The statute provided the ICC with jurisdiction for the crimes of aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The court came into existence on July 1, 2002, and by 2019 the statute had been ratified by more than 120 countries; three of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, Russia, and the United States), however, had not approved it.'
My conclusion is that forces and people from The Russian Federation, with capital in Moscow, Ukraine and some parts of Europe and outside the Continent of Europe are actively involved and responsible for the war in Ukraine. The challenge is the blame was mostly put on some in the Russian Federation with its capital in Moscow.
In my opinion, just freezing and seizing the assets of a person and or persons who are innocent is a serious crime and in this instance may amount to pillaging which is a war crime.
Written by Abiodun Mohammed Adeyemi Ajijola
Posted on Saturday, 6th December 2025
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